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M SEPTEMBER 15, rgr7,* the CeotraI Committee of the 
I 
Bolshevik Party, the headquarters of which were'then ' 
in Petrograd, received two letters from Lenin through the 5 
usual secret channels. The leader of the RevoIutim, who had 
been obliged to go into hiding, insisted that the Bolsheviks 
take state power into their own hands. 
What were the circumstances that gave rise to this demand? ' 
What c h g e s  in class relationships impelled the Bolsheviks 
to raise the question of capturing power at that particular i 
The Kordov revolt in August, 1917, had k e n  suppressed, 
and General Kornilov himself with his conf&&erals 
. But General Alexeyev, who had been a party to the K o d o v  
plot, had been appointed Chief of StafE of General I3-d.. 
quarters. As for the pmceedings against KorPiIov himself, 
they were being conducted in such a marmer that the Genemi 
. a m e d  as amuser rather than accused. He was given free 
- to all secret documents, and *ugh the medium of 
proxies was able to publish whatever he found necessary about 
the trial, His "jail" was the building of the Girls' School in 
Bykhov, and his guard the Tekinsky Regiment, which had bub 
recently been his petsonat bodjguard. 
Under such a "prison" regime and with so "watchful" a 
- 
* September 8,917, N~sw Style. All dates in thia €umk are Old SMe, 
guard, KornilwI who had the advantage of being freed from 
the &cult and arduous task of commanding an army, could 
analyze his defeat at 1eisltl.e and elaborate new plans, Dispatch 
riders were constantly scurryiag between Bykhov and GeneraI 
Headquarters of the Russian m y ;  officers visited KorniIov 
f d y ,  supplying him with important information and news. 
Iduentid bankers and represenbtives of foreign powers visited 
him in "jail!' All this afforded Kornilov the opportuni~ of 
elaborating a new plan of attack on the revoIution-the second 
Kornilov plot. This time Komilov and the counter-revolutionary 
forces that were back of him endeavored to concoct a mu& 
more thorough-going plan of action involving incomparably 
greater forces. In August it had been planned to throw a 
mere corps of from 15,- to 2 0 , ~  men against Petrograd. 
Now a11 plans were based on hundreds of thousands, to include, 
in the Erst place, the Shock Battalions, consisting of approxi- 
mately 5 0 , ~  picked men recommended by their officers, the 
Juafrer Schools, the OEcersJ Training Schmls and the senior 
grades of the Cadet Corps, numbering from 4 5 , p . t o  50,000 
excellently equipped men, and the cavalry divisions, mainly 
Cossack units. In addition particular attention was accorded 
the Gechoslovak Corps, which the tsarist government had 
begun to form, but which had actually been fully orgadzed 
under the Provisional Govermmmt. By October this Grps 
n m h r e d  over 30,- men trained on the French model and 
commanded by picked officers. The Corps was disposed on the 
right bank of the Dnieper, so that it c d d  easily occupy all 
the railroad junctions and cut off the southwestern front from 
Petrograd and Moscow, which were preparing to rise. 
Besides these forces, there was the Polish Corps, under 
General Dowber-Musnicki, This corps was made up of Poles 
who had seen regular service in the old army and had been 
6 
recommended by two Potih ofiicers. Tbcre were three times 
as many officers in it as in any regular army corps. It is not 
difficult to understand what side the P o l i  Corps was on under 
these &cumskwms. The Corps was stationed in Byelorussia 
In the event of aa uprisig in Petrograd, it could quickly cut Toff the western front and hold up any troop trains that at- 
tempted to go to the assistance of the insurgent workers, 
THE SECOND KORNILOV PLOT 
The instigators of the second Kornilov plot could thus count 
on from ooo,ooo to 250,000 men. With the existence of an 
army at las t  ten million strong, a quarter of a d i m  would 
on the surface of it not appear to be of decisive account. But 
by that time the army was no longer an &dent fighting force. 
Two hundred thousand soldiers massed in a single driving 
force could compel wavering regiments to act on its side. It 
was on this that Kornilov w a s  b k b g .  Such were the plans 
of the cwnter-revolutionaries, 
The historians who endeavored to reconstruct the picture 
of the second KomiIov plot were faced with a &cult task, 
for no documents on the second Kornilov plot were to be 
found in any of the archives. No records whatever existed. 
Those who had participated in the plot had left practically no 
w. It was necessary to proceed in a roundabout and fairly 
tortuous way that promised much labor and no few dis- 
appointments. 
First of dl they set about studyhg the daily orders that had 
been issued by the General Staff during the months of Sep- 
tember and October 1917. At first glance it seemed an almost 
hopeless a s k  to find the necessary clue in the tedious batch of 
marching orders issued to the various units. But one particular 
circumstance struck the investigators. In the latter part of Sep- 
7 
t e m k ,  Cossack regiments and occasionally entire divisions had 
begun to be withdrawn horn the front and transferred to the 
rear. The official reason for this movement was  everywhere the 
same frequently repeated statement: "Shortage of fodder at 
the front.'' 
But when further investigation revealed where the Cossack 
uni ts  were being dispatched, it became dear that it was not 
at all a matter of fodder. Two divisions had been sent to Fin- 
h d ,  one division to the Donbas and one to Bryansk. There was 
not wen a hint of fodder in these districts. The fact was that 
from Finland it was possible to reach Petrograd in forty-eight 
hours, while from Bryansk and the Donbas it was possible to 
move on the North and -cut off the road connecting Moscow 
with the Ukraine and the southwestern front. 
The disposition of the cavalry contingents dearly disclosed 
the reason for tlleir movements: the cavalry was being put in 
readiness to fight against the revolution. 
In this way the due was discovered, differing from the mythi- 
Eal due of Ariadne's in that instead of leading frem the laby- 
rinth it was a guide to its very depths. A closer study was made 
of the movements of the regiments and the nature of the newly 
formed units. The so -ded  Shock Battalions were examined 
more thoroughly. This was the name given to the battalions 
of Cavaliers of the Cross of St, George, of kulaks' sons, under- 
graduates, etc., formed in ~ g r  7. Agah according to the OW 
version these battalions had been organized to assist the regular 
= m y ,  witb a view to reenforcing the regiments that showed 
a disindinatim to fight, and thus welding the disintegrating 
army together. 
Nevertheless, despite the official declarations, the Shoclc Bat- 
Urn had not been dispatched to the front where they were 
needed, but strangely enough had been movd closer to Petro- 
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ening Catastrophe and How to Fight It," "The Crisis Has .' 
Matured," "Will the Bolsheviks Rebin State Power?; * letters 
on the uprising, and numerous additional documents of emr- 
mous international import. 
In bis brilIiant articles, written so simply that every worker 
could comprehend them, Lenin laid bare the most intriate 
weavings of the bourgeois, Socialist-Revolutionary and Men- 
shevik press, tore the mask from the faces of the Kornilwite 
Scihlists--=ensky and Co.-mercilessly castigated the trai- 
tors to the revolution, eiiticized the slightest manifestation a£ 
vacillation in the ranks of the Bolsheviks and at every stage 
of fie revolution pointed out the path and methods of struggle 
for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
b i n  providentially saw that the bourgeoisie was adopting 
a new form of struggIe, that it was making preparations for 
a avil war against the w o r k s  and peasants. 
Civil war is the high& form of class struggle. In it all 
the inherent antagonisms of the class struggle become more 
acute and the class struggle develops into an armed conflict. 
Civil war is the acutest form of class struggle; ill society is 
divided into two hostile mmps, and the question of power is 
decided by force of arms. 
Continuing and further developing Marx's doctrine, Lenin 
mote as follows about the essence of civil war: 
I d  
. . . experience . . . shows us that civil war is the sharpest 
form of the class struggle; it is that point ia the class struggle 
when dashes and battles, economic and politid, repeating 
& m d v e s ,  growing, broadening, becoming acute, turn into an 
armed struggle of one class against another class." (V. I. 
k i n ,  CoUected Works, Vol. XXI, p. 231). 
* Cf. V. I. k i n ,  CoUbttd Workr, Vol. XXI, International Publisbuq 
New York All references unless otherwise stated are from + 
lihed by International PnbSiers, New Ymk-Ed. 
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tion r d d  in Septdm-October 19~7. 
, ~ w a s ~ c d b y t h c * d b g w i P t b e f ~ ~ f  
' 8trqggit of all h s  of Ehe ppakhL 
Fit of all, the prohrht's strike form of stniggle tu&r- 
went a ndid change. Evm before the K a d o v  the 
I ptofeat+t, under the Idemhip of the &ldm& Party, had 
mgaged in strikes that had constantly assumed larger dimen- 
&Is* h o m i c  Stfikesw gmwll into politid strikes, bc#lm- 
itrg in&rwoveu with the latter and displaying an unmemhg 
teaden9 to spmd, &cumulating, as it w&e, the forms fox a 
decisive blow. But after the comber-revolutiotlary Kmnilm 
revolt was suppressed a new fature a- in the ~~ 
. class strikes, aa ihstmted by the folio*: the workem of 
the R&&-Sde Warkg in aharkuv decked a strike* 
out the plant mamgemat and took over the m d n g  of tk 
plant themaetves, Ln a n u m k  of leather works in M o m  +he 
workers removed their managem, ~~, m,, and elected mike 
c o m m b  which were entrusted with keeping production p 
,kg, The new fmture in the strike nmvanenk waa that the 
proletariat not d y  went an strike, but drove out the =pi&,' p t o o k o v e r t h c f a c t m i e s a u d ~ n t h e m ~ w .  
Today upon Iooking over the d o u s  documents dating to i the year 1917 on the quation d the labor one - 
I flrpd thousands of facts bearing out thi~ state of afhh. M, of course, had no w& referam dontmeuts. He knew only of 
' 
bkted instal- w w l  had swnebow fwad their way * 
the press. But on the basis af these facts the great d u t h q  
leader arrived at the g m c d  conclusion that the strikes of the 
works had d r e  arrived at the &qge of ~~ and 
&at the proletarian straggle was d r d p  f a d  with the ques- 
tion of pamr* 
I I 

bmating,'ttc., apart from the wrecking of -m, and it is 
gf once apparent that while the peaaefd forms of strag& 
W from February to August, from September they 
decreased with an accompanying increase in the violent form: 
seizure of estates, W n g  of mmrs, and division of farm 
impIements and livest&. At present we are in pssessiun of 
numerous s ta t is t id  compilations and documents which m&m 
thh change in the form of the peasant struggle. Here again 
i~ shown the brilliant penetration of I d n ,  who without all 
this data which we now have, was able to arrive at the condu- 
eim that the peasant movement had evolved into a peasid 
j n s u d o n .  
An acute change in the nature of the movement for national 
emahap~tion also took place. Beginning with February this 
movement had been beaded by the bourgeois nationalists, who 
for a short time had succeeded in duping and oc4mally even 
directly forcing a definite part of the masses to follow their 
lead. 
After the suppression of the Kornilw revolt the nature of 
this mmrmt changed most decidedly. The -king p p i e  
of the oppressed nations tried to extend a hand to the paants 
and workers of Russia over the beads of their "leaders," so 
I 
that together they could march against the Provisionat &- 
emment. The masses of the people began to undkstand that 
the onIy way they could destroy the old tsarist "prison of 
nations" was under the leadership of the Bolsheviks. 
h September, 1917, a spontaneous movement flared up in 
Tashkent. The repmm&tives of the Provisional Governeat 
fled. For a time the warking people were masters of the ci 
This &a not mean t h t  Soviet power was vidorious in 
kent before *grad. Such an assertion would ix incorrect 
if d y  for the fact that the movement in Tashkmt was not 
in the hands of the Bolsheviks. What, then, did the Tashkent 
'events indi&e? They indicated that all the contiadktions had 
become intensely aggravatd, f i d y  reareaching a d i  in those 
place6 where they were m o s t  rife-in the national and colonia5 
districts. It is of interest to note that on the em of the Febru- 
ary Revolution, too, it was in k t i a l  Asia, where the contra- 
t i k t h s  were particularly acute, that they came to a head. 
On the eve of the October holutioa, the events in Tashkent 
indicated that the movement for national emancipation had 
adopted a new form of struggle for power. 
Finally, a radical changc took place in the movement in the 
army, where the Bolsheviks had been arrying on an enormous 
amount of work to open the eyes of the soldiers, to win them 
wer to their side. In numerous regiments and divisions the 
soldiem had driven wt their old officers, electing new can- 
manders from their own ranks and taking over command of 
the units themselves. Such instances had been hewn previously 
also, but they were isolated cases and did not beara mass char- 
acter. After the Komilov revolt had been put down, millions 
of soldiers realized that the rebellioa of the generals aimed at 
the restoration of the monarchy and hence the prolongation of 
the war. The soldiers were seized with horror at the thought 
of the possibility of having to spend a fourth winter in the 
trenches. They went over to the new form of s&1e with a 
vengeance: kicked out the Sacialist-Revolutionary and Men- 
~hevik windbags from their regiments, re-elected their com- 
mittees, voted for the Bolsheviks, drove o;ut their officers and 
in many places, in the Navy, even killed them, More than 
that-the soldiers came out as agitators for a peasant uprising. 
In thousands of letters sent from the front, the soldiers ad- 
vised the peasants to drive out the landlords and s e i ~  the 
land. Behind the lines the mIdiers t h d v e s  i n i W  such 
14 
inevements. The soldiers' mwement clerrrIy manifested a ten- 
: dmey to merge with the m t  movement. 
It wiw this change in the form of struggle that @Utd 
the bdhnt  dhktidan, tenin, to draw the mnclusim that 
. .  the ~ l u t i ~  crisis, bmbId at the Sxtb Congrew of the 
Party i August 1917, was at had ,  making it W b l e  far the 
. Bolsheviks to raise the question of wmthrowing the didat* 
ship of the lmwgeo1de. 
I 
TOWARD SOVIET POWER 
1 Between Septembr 12 and 14-unfortunately, it bas hen 
! impossible to establish the e x x t  date-lmin mate his letter 
, to the Central bnmittee of the Party in which he formulated 
"Having obtained a majotity in the Soviets of Workers' 
and Soldiers' Deputies of both ~~, the Bolsheviks cau, 
and must, take over the power of government!' (V. I. LRnin, 
SeLct~d Works, Vo1. VI, p. 215.) 
L m h  explained why it was that insurrection s t a d  on the 
ooder of the day at that &cular moment: 
"To Ix successfd, inswectioa must rely not upon cum@- 
acy md not upon a *, but upon the admeed class. That 
is the first point. Insurrection must rely upon the rising revo- 
lutionary spirit of the peopte. That is the second poiat. Insur- 
' 
rection must rely upan the c w d  mrrtasd in the history of 
tht growing revolution, when the activity of the advanced 
sanks of the people is at ih hdghf and when the -ow 
in the mnks of the enemies and m the mRs af thu W E ,  hdf- 
-(~d a d  iwesofut~ +& of thr r$IFd&on ar8 strongest. 
That is the third pint!' (Lmin and Stalk, The R h  R m  
zd078, p. 191.) 
' - These thre factors d t d .  
"We have the following of the majority of a c h s ,  the van- 
guard of the  evolution, the vanguard of the people. whicb is 
capable of e n g  the masses with it." (IN., p. 172.) 
The deed and famine-stricken people d e e d  that only 
the p l ~ t  cudd give them peace, land and bread. 
"We have the foIlowing of the mujority of the people." 
(1 M.) 
A hclc of faith in their forces, a lack of cohesion, codd be 
felt in the camp of the closest allies of the bourgeoisie. 
After the overthrow of the autocracy in February rgr 7, the 
Provisional Government, with the consent of the Mensheviks 
and ,%cialist-Revolutionaries, had ref rained f rum proclaiming 
Russia a republic, under the pretext that the question of the 
form of government, like all the other burning questions of 
the revolution, was a matter to be decided by the Constituent 
Assembly, the convocation of which was constantly being put 
off. Immediately after the revoIt of General Kornilov, the 
Sociatist-Revolutionaries md Mensheviks, under pressure of 
the masses, had inclined towards the revolution, d&ding that 
Russia be declared a republic. But this shift to the Left was 
extremely short-lived. Realizing that they had not succeeded 
, 
in increasing their prestige among the masses, whiIe the bour- 
geoisie was regarding them askance, the Socialist-Revolu tim- 
aries and Mensheviks backed up again into their old bourgeois 
stalls. 
Vacillation was also manifest in the camp of the bourgeois 
party of the Gonstitutional--rats (Cadets). The latter 
were unable to obviate the antagonisms between their two 
groups. The Lfts were demanding an agreement with the 
Socialist-Revolutiomries and Mensheviks, while the Rights 
were negotiating with he Black Hundreds. Of course, these 
amta@rrisms should not be exaggerated, but, nevertheless, in 
I I 16 
the &sting candidom of revolutionary dds ,  these d&teri~cs 
wpkmed the enemy camp. 
The &ef d h  of the Russian bowphde, the jmperialists 
of the Entente, were dso wavering betman a war to a w d -  
o ~ d i  (1oncIusian a d  a sepate p c e  with German h p e d h  
against R-ia for the purpose of crushing the R e  m a -  
Intion. 
Fmch historiaus have published feiegmms that had been 
kept out of the press in 1917 by the censors. Eva  from this 
raeager i n f o d o n  it is obvious that unrest Id begun to 
d h t  itself among the French mps in the autumn of ~917. 
The soldiers d a a d m i  pewe. The anti-mr mommat had 
I seixed on whole c o y ,  spreading to the British d t s  aa well. 
Poinark has admitted in his Msmoirs that there was not a 
single mrp in the Fren& Army that add have ken d k  
, p f d ~ e d  to Paris for the purpose of supprdng a p s i &  
uprising of the workers. Tbe imperialists were feeling the m- 
ace of ml* ia their own muatria too. 
Urged on by their bar of revoIutian, Great Briiain and I 
France began to send out feelers with m d  to the passim 
of concluding peace with Gemmy. The r q m s e  on the part 
of Gemmy was ad that could be desired. At the heginning 
of September, a German representative approached the Fmch 
Minister of Foreign M&s with a proposal to conclude peace, 
i. agreed to concessions to France and Grat  B r i a  
in the West pmided she d d  d v e  her share in the East. E erstwhile enemies to inakc paa at the orpense 
1 ,oiRmda. 
Negotiations wete Goflducted in tbe micrest secrecy, Ail 
~ s t k & f o u n d ~ w a y i n ~ t h e p ~ e s s w e r e d a c t a r e d h ~  
dder by the respecthe grwernmms. Howmx, the e r i m s  
w; eddeotly the hp?ri&$ts were chma&g tw 
. 9 - 
much of one another. Germany then end~vored to start nego- 
tiations with Russia for a sepatate pace. 
k i n  knew nothing of these vtiations. But his vast 
powers of penetration enabled him to predict not only the neg* 
tidim between these two imperialist groups, but also the 
attempt of Eumany to conclude a separate p- with Russia. 
fnformatiw has recently come to light definitely confirming 
Lain's briIliant insight. 
In his memoirs on the revolution, written after the mdu- 
sion of the Civil War, David R. Francis, American Ambas- 
sador to Russia at that time, tells the fallowing interesting 
M s :  Tereshchedm, then Minister of F k c e  and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, visited Archangel and dined with him 
twice. He was using the assumed name of Titov. H e  had 
gone to Kolckk on a special mission from Gdcevich, Russian 
Ambusador to Sweden. Tereshdenko assured Fmus that 
he had received favorable peace terms from Getmany around 
August I and that the only pwson he had shown them to was 
Kerensfcy. 
Behind the hcks of the peaple, the counter-revolutides, 
like Nicholas Romanov on the eve of his fa, were preparing 
to sell out the country only to free their hands for the strug- 
pie against the revolution. 
h n i n  cuncluded his letter to the Central C d t t e e  as 
follows : 
"AU the objective conditions for a successful insurrection 
exist. We have the exceptional advantage of a situation in which 
ody our swcess in the insurrection can put an end to that most 
harassing thing m earth, vacillation, which has worn the people 
out ; a situation in which only our success in the insurrection 
can foil the game of a separate peace directed against the 
revolution by publicly proposing a fuller, juster and earlier 
ptace to the b d t  of #hr r m o t ~ t b t . ~  (Itrid., p. 193.) 
18 
- The great I& of the revolution d c d  a tbe Party to 
proceed to insurrectioa As yet, Lain did not speak in his 
let- of the emtct date for the uprising. In his opinion, this 
qwtion d d  be s d c d  only by d d ~ o n  of those who were 
ia touch with the wmkers and soldim, with the masses; in 
other words, by the Cmtd Cumnittee of the Party. LRnin 
M s t g d  that preparation of the armed uprising be on the 
order of the day in all work of the Party. 
PREPARATIONS FOR INSURRECTION 
h d n g  u p  the Party to make p ~ t i m s  for armed 
insufrection. Leni recommended that the Party change its 
tactics, above all its attitude towards the Democratic Confer- 
ence. The Iatter had been called by the Sociatist-Rwoluthdes 
and Mensheviks- with a view to hoodwinking the masses, as 
a counterfeit, substitute Crrnstituent Assembly. 
The Bolsheviks had participated in the Democratic Confer- 
ence in order to e x p e  the xuadmtions of the Sodalist- 
Revolutionaries and Men&& from its platform. But with 
the adoption of the line of arrned insurrection it became impw 
sible to remain in the Conference. To do so would result in 
m i s l d h g  the masses, would strengthen the iiru~ons about 
peaceful devdopment of the revolutim and induce the masses 
to depart from the revolutionary ~ t h .  Lenin proposed leaving 
the Conference after =ding a B o l s h d  declaration exposing 
the vile game of the comp&. 
"Having read this declaration, and having appealed for deci- 
sions and not talk, for atim and not resolution-writing, we 
must d;SPatch our whole fraction to the frrctosies a d  the bm- 
mcks. Their place is there ; the pulse of life is there ; the muxe 
of salvation of the revolution is there; the motive force of 
the Democratic Conference is there.'' (IW, p. 195.) 
19 
The course that had been adopted of p d i n g  to m e d  
insurrection demanded that the tactics of participation in the 
Conference be abandoned far the tactic of boycotting the 
Conference. 
This second Ietter of Lenin's to the Central Committee of 
the Bdshevik Party was devoted to the questirm of preparing 
for armed action, and was entitled "Marxism and Insurrec- 
tion." Proceeding from the experience of the revolutions that 
had taken place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, h i n  
made a thorough and profound summary of the laws of insur- 
rection. But he did more than sum up the experience, more 
than develop and continue Marx's and Engels' teaching in the 
new conditions ; he at the same time elaborated concrete direc- 
tives for the organidon of the uprising in Petrograd, 
He wrote : 
"And in order to treat insurrection in a Marxist way, he., 
as an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single 
moment, organize a staff of the insurrectionary detachments ; 
we must distribute our forces, we must move the-reliable regi- 
ments to the most important points; we must surround the 
Alexandrinsky Theater [where the Democratic Conference was 
I in session.-I. M.] ; we must occupy the Peter and Paul Fort- 
m s ;  we must arrest the General Staff and the government; 
we must move against the junkers and the Savage Division 
such detachments as will rather die than allow the enemy to 
approach the center of the city; we must mobilize the armed 
workers and call upon them to engage in a last desperate fight ; 
we must occupy the telepraph and telephone stations at once, 
quarter mr staff of the insurrection at the central telephone 
station and connect it by teIephone with alf the factories, all 
the regiments, all the points of armed fighting, etc," (Ibid.) 
Ldn himself did not call this a plan of action, but an 
illustration of what it means to treat insurrection as an art. 
But anyme who is aware of the actual course of the subsquent 
20 
a can see h m  Lsnin had &id&% the 
carefully he had studied the requisites for 
is known, Lenin's directives were carried out in fulI in th$ 
urse of the uprising. 
Lain's letter was. discussed by the Central Committee of' 
the 3olshevik Party on September 15. At tbis meeting the 
traitor, Kamenev, was the only one to speak against Lenin. -. 
The Central Committee resolutdy rebuffed the terrified 
coward. Comrade Stalin proposed that the letter be printed 
and sent out to the largest organizations of the Bolshevik Party, 
which was done. 
"At the end of September," S t a l i  wrote on the occasioa: 
f the first anniversary of the great p r o l t e  revolution, , 
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to 
ilize all the forces of the Party for the organization of;i . 
ccessful uprising." (J. V. Stalin, fh the October Revoiw;' 
don, p. 19, Russ. ed) 
The entire work of the Party was directed towards the 
preparation of armed action. By September 17, two days aftmi . 
tenm's letter was first discussed, S u n ,  editor of the mouth- I piece of the Bolshevik Party, was able to write in R&ocky~ 
Put (The Worhrd R o d ) ,  as the Pravda was then called : a 1 
''The revolution is marching on. Fired at in the July days' b and 'buried' at tbs Moscow Council, it is raising its head again, I " 
breaking down the old obstacles, creating a new power. The: 
first line of trenches of the counter-rewlution has been mp- ' 
turd. After Kmilov, Kaledin is now retreating. In the ibmes, 
of the struggle the moribund Soviets are reviving. They are' 
once again tacing the helm and leading the revolutionary maws. 
"All p m w  to the Sm*ebshnch is the slogan af the new' 
movement. . . . 
"The straight question which life raises demaads a clear 
and definite answer. 
"For the Soviets or against them?'' ( LRnia and Sari, The 
Russiau Rwolufidr~,. pp. r 96-97,) 
Circumventing the censorship with consummate sW, Stdin 
gave a brilliant example of mass agitation for the armed upris- 
ing in the Iegd press. 
b r a d e  Stah's leading articles were reprinted in the 3d- 
she*, papers of Moscow, Byelorussia, and the Volga region. 
". . . In Russia the decisive growth of a new power is taking 
place, a genuine power of the people, a genuinely revolutionary 
power which is waging a desperate struggle for existence. On 
the one hand there are the Soviets, standing at the head of 
the revolution, at the head of the fight against the counter- 
revolution, which is not  yet crushed, which has only retreated, 
wisely hiding behind the back of the government. On the other 
hand there is the Kerensky government, which is shielding the 
ewnter-revolutionaries, is coming to an understanding with 
the Kornifovites (the Cadets !), has declared war upon the 
Soviets and is trying to crush them so as not to be crushed 
itself. 
"Who will conquer in this struggle ? That is the whole issue 
now . . . the main thing now is not to draw up general formu- 
las for 'saving' the revolution, but to render direct assistance 
to the Soviets in their struggle against the Kerensky Govern- 
ment." ( L m h ,  Stalk, I91  7, pp. 481-82.) 
The Party entered upon the priod of organizing an assault. 
Guided by Lenin's and Stalin's articles, the l d  organizations 
reorganized their work, placing the main emphasis in their 
propaganda and agitation on preparations for an armed u p  
rising. 
The pursuance of Lenin's line in the central organ roused 
the protest of Kamenev. This contemptible traitor strove to re- 
tard the mobilization of the masses. At a meeting of the Central 
Committee on Septemhr 20, Kamenev protested against the 
tone of the paper, which in his opinion was too sharp, and 
o b j d  to variaus expressions in the articles. The Central 
Committee adopted a special decision on this wore: 
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"While postponing a detailed discussim on the question of 
the running of the central organ, the Central Committee m 
ognizes that its general line fully ronforms with the line of 
the Central Committee." ( M d e s  of the Cer~tral Cow' t tee  
of the R.SJI.LJ'., p. 69, Russ. ed.) 
The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party fully ap- 
proved the line of the central organ, which, in Stalin's editorids, 
was calmly and firmly pursuing Lenin's policy of pie* 
for armed action. 
Preparations for the armed uprising were conducted in the 
strictest secrecy. In Petrograd StaIin summoned representatives 
of the various districts to a secret meeting ia a private apart- 
ment, p e r s d y  instructing them as to what units to get ready 
- for d o n ,  what buildings to occupy in the districts and how 
to reorganize their agitation. From time to time, letters explain- 
ing the new course, frequently in code, were sent out to the 
various regions. Use was also made of aPessengers, for the 
most part members of the Central Committee. 
On September 21, the Central Committee discuss@ the 
tactid measures to be taken in line with the course that had 
been adopted of preparing for i n s u d o n .  It was n-
to decide the question of withdrawal from &e Democratic 
Confer-. As a matter of fact, the Conference was Iiving 
its last hours, The Sodist-Revolutides and Mensheviks, 
continuing to deceive the masses, had decided to terminate the 
sitting of the Democratic Conference and to appoint a mvi- 
E s i d  Council of the Russian Republic from among its dele gates. This new body had the right to interrogate the mem- bers of the government, while the latter, as in the British Parliament, could either answer or maintain silence as they 
chose. The Council of the Republic was not empowered to 
compel them to answer. In general, the Council had no legis- 
The Sdt-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, however, 
strove to lend this mongrel hdy  the appeamnce and role of 
a parliamentary institution. In their press they d e d  this new ' 
M y  the Pieliminwy Parliament { Pre-parliament ) . The Bol- 
sheviks thus had to dmide on their attitude towards this new 
Sacialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik institution. The Cen- 
tral Committee issued instructions not to enter the Pre-patlia- 
ment and to boycott it. This decision was transmitted to the 
Bolshevik group in the Democratic Conference. 
Kamenev, Ryazanw ;md Rykov, who were members of the 
group, were opposed to the decision of the Central Committee. 
These mpitulators and defenders of capitaism, fighting 
against an armed uprising, insisted on participation in the Pre- 
parliament. The opponents of the boycott succeeded in saw- 
ing the support of the majority of the Party representatives in 
the Dmmratic Conference; 77 of the grwp members, as 
against 50, expressed themselves in favor of participating in 
the Re-parliament, whose task was to dupe the people. 
The opponents of insurrection, instead of fighting for the 
immediate capture of power, continued to cling to participation 
in the Pre-parliament. This group had to be exposed and 
"It is the duty of the proletariat, as the leader of the Russian 
mvoltttion," wrote Stalin in an editorial of the centrd organ 
of the BoIshevik Party, Rdochy Put, "to tear the mask from 
this government and to expose its real counter-revolutionary 
face to the masses. . . . It is the duty of the proletariat to 
dose its ranks and to prepre tirelessly for the impending 
httl:es. 
"The workers and soldiers in the Eapita! have already taken 
the first step, by passing a vote of no confidence in the Ker- 
ensky-Konovdov government. . . . 
"It is now for the proviaces to say their word!' (Lmk, 
Std?t, 1917, p. 503.) 
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XRATIQNS IN THE PROVINCES 1 
September 23, the Socialist-Revoluti~es and Mashe- 
la the All-Russian CtintraI Executive Committee, under 
of the masses, had f d l y  passed a decision to convene . 
t Second Congress of Soviets on October lo. Beginning with A 
.September 27, the Rabochy Pub carried the call:. 
, a  
UFdIow workers, soldiers and peasants! Get ready for thc 
. All-Russian Congress of Soviets on October ao! Convene 
Regional Congresses of Soviets immediately 1" 
On Septmber zg, the !Central Committee of the Bolshevik 
Farty d v e d  to convene a congress of the Soviets of the 
Northern Region-Finland, Petrogmd and its environ+wke 
of the -tasks of the Cwgress was to expedite the agitational 
and organjzational preparations for armed insurrection. Its 
1 
a Bolshevik spirit prevailed, to take place on October 5. One - 
. decisions were to serve as a model for the Regional Congresses 
'throughout the camtry. 
In the latter half of Septembw: 'the work of preparing for 
armed insurrection became most intensive in the provinces as 
. A. The rCeab-al Committee allocated strictly defined fmc- 
tians to each of the rariws provinces. The Byelomssian Party 
' 
organization, in which Ftunze and Myasnikov were e v e ,  
-bas inmeted by the Central Gotmuittee to put out Bolshevik 
cordom for the purpose of intercepting troap trains coming 
from the western front to the aid of Kerensky. Similar instruc- 
tions were issued to the Polessye organization which spas 
located in Gomel and which was headed by Kagmovich. Txoop 
trains passed through Gon~el en route to Petrograd and Mos- 
cow. The Volga region, where Kuibyshev was stationed, re- 
ceived instructions, first, t o  keep Kereasky from using the local 
garrisons, second, to take charge of collecting E d  supplies 
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for the revolution and to prepare stores of grain for shipmetlt 
to Petregrad and Mosoow after the Wry of the revdution. 
Sverdlw wrote a letter to the Bolsheviks in the Urals instruct- 
ing them to continue the struggle in the event that the uprising 
in Petmgmd and M o m w  fell through. The cities and indus- 
trial centers of the Urals, like Shadrhsk, where Zhdanov 
was active, got armed detachments ready for the uprising. 
The Bolsheviks of Northern Caucasus, in the person of 
Kirov* were instructed to threaten Kaledin's positions in the 
Kuban and Don Region in order to prevent him from moving 
his tmops to the assistance of the other counter-revolutionary 
forces. An agent of the Central Committee was sent to Voro- 
shilov in the Don& Basin, where he was chairman of the 
I 
Bolshevik organization, editor of the loml Party newspaper 
and chairman of the Lugansk Soviet, to give him notice* of 
the insurrection. AU puwer here was virtually in Voroshilov's 
hands. The representatives of the Provisid Government 
counted for nothing in this district. The p p I e  in the lhnetz 
Basin were onIy waiting for a signal from the Central Com- 
mittee to remove these representativa. 
In the Ufa Region the food committees were in the hands 
of the Sdalist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and it was 
clear enough that they wauld try to stawe the revolution. For 
dais reason the Bolsheviks in this region were given instruc- 
tions to enter these committees, work in them, collect grain 
and load it on echdons; these delons, however, were to be 
placed on sidings and sent on ody at the demand of the Central 
Committee. 
In Baku, Shaumyan and Djaparidze were among those who 
directed preparations for the attack. 
There was not a single large region that did not receive 
some assignment from the Central Committee. 
26 
N a a y ,  however, the work of prepmbg the ass~ult waS 
. most widely developed in Petrograd, where such m l e  as 
Molotov, Katinin and Andreyev were working under the direct 
leadership of .Lenin and S t a h  It was here that the plan for 
I the uprising itself was elabomted. It was proposed to reIy 
on the Red Guard, wKih numbered 12poo armed mea at the 
beginning of October, the revolutimary dm of Kmmtdt  
and the Baltic Fleet and certain units of the P& Gar- 
On October 3, wben preparations for armed action were su f - 
kiently widespread, the Central Committee decided to request 
Lenin to come to P-, so tbat he w d d  be closer to 
the center of events. 
ZRnin received this decision in Vyborg, whence he had made ,. 
his way from Hlsingfors in order to be nearer Petmgrad. 
Two days later, Octobw 5, the Central Committee resolved 
to withdraw from the Pre-parliament at its very first sitting. 
Lienia arrived in Petrograd on October 7, in conformity with 
the decision of the Central W t t e e ,  and immediately 
plunged into the preparatory work there. 
At this time the international and internal situation had 
taken a hun such as put a new light on the question of w e d  
insurrection facing the Par& 
THE .INTEKNAIITONAL SITUATION 
First of all, there had been a mutiny on the ships of the 
German Navy stationed in Kid. The sailors of five cruisers 
had raised the Red Flag and gone ashore to muse the garrison 
to insumdon. The d o r s  of the N w d m g  had thrown 
their d c e r s  overboard and steamed 0% to N o m y  to join 
forms with the Russian tevolution. Surr~unded by stLbmarines 
and mine-layers, the ship had been compelled to surrender. 
Aftw a tnurmmry trial by court-martial, many a f the sailorii 
h&d been shot. Approximately 10,- sailors of the b a n  
Navy had taken part in this movement. It was d W t  to hush - 
up this matter. Some mention of it had treen made ixl the 
Reichs,tag. Lain understood that revolutionary action on the 
part of the international working class, which he had foretold 
and which revolutionaries abroad were preparing for, was not 
a matter of the distant future. If mass action had taken place 
even &such a military prison house as m o d i t  Germany, 
it could be imagined what inflammatory material had accumu- ' 
lated throughout the world. 
Today we can avail ourselves of Poinmri's Memoirs, a com- 
pilation of information which the censors had held back in 
rgr 7. All this material confirms the existence of a revolutionary 
situation in England and France. 
The correlation of forces within Russia had also changed 
to a marked degree. News kept coming in from all parts of 
the country about the growth of the peasant uprising, the 
national movement for emancipation and the movcrnent in the 
+ 
army. The revolution had made giant strides in one month. 
On the other hand, the counter-revolutionaries were also taking 
steps. Kertmsky was openly preparing to surremder Petrograd 
to the Germans, so that the iron heel of the Geman imperial- 
ists might crush the revolution. 
With this end in view, h was proposed b withdraw the 
garrison from Petropd, ostensibly for the purpose of de- 
fending the city against the Germans, but actually in order to 
remove rhe garrison from the influence of the Bolsheviks. 
AII this made the question of the armed uprising more pressing. 
On October 10, in the evening, a meeting of the Centrd 
Committee of the Bolshevik Party was hefd. Commde S d -  
lov reported on the situation on the northern and western 
,'fmats. A Boishdk spirit prevailed there. The Minsk Gar- F' r im wasan the side of the Bol&ds .  But at the same tk haw, the M-T-revoluti~ndes were up to smmtbg. j negot&iw ,were in progress between General H e a d q e n  sad S M  H-I of the Western Front. &BS&S were 
- being drawn to Minsk, and agitation waa being arritd on 
r agahst tbe Bolsheviks, Obviously, preparations were being 1 
made to surround and disarm the fwolutionaq troops. 
' hnin tmk the flow after Sverdlov and delivered a report 
on the current situation. After d u g  a detailed aaalysis of 
the international and i n t d  situation, Len& pointed out the 
- great importance of thoroughgoing technical preparations for 
armed insurrection. 
"From the political sbndpoint," W n  summed up, '%the time 
is quite ripe for the transfer of power. , . . We must discuss 
the technid side. That is the whole point." (Lmk, Stalk, 
1917, p. 580.) 
Lmh particularly stressed the fact that the palitid 
tion had matured and tbat it was now a question of the time 
of the uprising. He came out with the direci propasal to utilize 
the Congrw of Saviets of tbe Northern Region and the readi- 
ness of the Bolshevik-minded Minsk G w r h n  to take the 
offensive "to begin decisiw action." 
Lenin w'as convinced of the necessity for an immediate offen- 
sive; in his opinion further delay would be fatal, and he pro- 
posed that anp pretext k seized on to begin the uprising either 
in Petrogmd or in Moscow, in Minsk or in Helsingfors. But 
under the given circumstanoe8, the decisive battlurrespxiive 
of where the uprising began or its immediate =-had ta 
be fought in Petrograd, the politid center of the country and 
the d e  of the revolution. 
Thus, h n h  considered that the point at issue at that pticc- 
ular moment was the setting of the dote for the uprising. ' 
His d ~ i o n s  were embodied in a short resolution drawn 
up by himself and outlining the Party d i d v e s  with exeep- 
tional precision and clarity : 
"The Central Committee rwgnizes that the international 
position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German 
Navy, which is an extreme manifestation of the growth 
throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution; the a t  
of conclusion of peace by the imperialists with the object of 
stranglhg the revolution in Russia) as well as the military 
situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie 
and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petropd to the Germans), 
and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority 
in the S o v i e t 4  this, taken in conjunction with the peasant 
revolt and the swing of popular confideme towards our Party 
(the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious prepara- 
tions being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal 
of troops from Petragtad, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petro- 
grad, the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.)--all this 
places the armed uprising on the order of the day. 
"Considering, therefore, that an armed uprising is inevitable, 
and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Cen-ml Committee 
instructs all Party organizations to be guided accordingly, 
and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress 
of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrad of troops 
from Petrograd, the action of our people in MOSCQW and 
Minsk, etc.) from this point of view!' (V, I. Luin, Sebctsd 
Works, Vol. VI, p. 303.) 
At the meeting of the C e n d  Committee, Kamenw and 
Zinoviw, who were subsequently exposed as traitors, spoke 
against Lenin. 
These defenders of capitalism were resolutely remed  by 
the Bolshevik Centia Committee. No one supported thw 
arrant capitulators, and Lenin's resolution k a m e  the direc- 
tive for the entire Bolshevik Party. 
The preparations for armed insurrectim entered a decisive 

t h e  Committee of the Petrograd Soviet decided, against two 
dissenting votes, tbat the garrim troops should not be with- 
drawn and that a Revolutionary Military Committee should be 
set up to see to the wrying out of this decision. On Octo- 1 
6 13, the Mdiers' Secrion of the Petragrad Soviet endorsd ; 
-the organization of Revolutionary Military Committees. The I 
Revolutionary Military Cornmitt= thus bemme the 1egaHy 
functioning headquarters of the uprilng. 
The plan for the uprising was based on the directives given 
by h i n  in his letter "Marxism and Insurrection." It was 
propased to summon the Baltic sailors from 'Helsingfors to 
the -pita1 to reenforce the Petrogmd units, for which purpose 
a coded telegram was drawn up stating: "Dispatch the field 
reguhtions." This meant: the uprising has begun, send on 
armored cruisers and detachments of sailors. 
In every district, committees of three were set up, consisting 
of the Chairman of the Soviet, the Party secretary of the dis- 
trict, and a representative of the district Red Guard. These 
committees kept a close watch on all milikry institutions, 
banks and government o h s  of their respective districts. 
Definite units of Red Guards were assigned to occupy various 
institutions in their districts; others were assigned to go to 
the Smolny,* Representatives of the CentraI Committee made 
the rounds of all the railway junctions around Petrugrad to 
ascertain whether Bolshevik cordons had been posted in those 
places to stop Kernsky's troop trains. The Bolshevik organ- 
izations were instructed to disarm the soldiers in case ad 
necessity. 
Mostow was notified of 'the fact that the uprising would 
* S d n y  htitute, a former &ml for daughters of the Russian 
biliry, WIG& had been b h n  over by the rwolutionaty organieatima of 
workers and soldiepa.-Ed. 
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tbe course of the next few days. In its turn Mas- 
on the word to Ivanovo, Shuya, Odthovo, etc. 
wn received definite instructions. A awl code was 
out for purposes of communication with all regional 
* t  -h rhg  these days, between October ro and r 5, in accord- 
,,am with the instructions of the Centrat Committee, Con- 
, gxewa of Soviets were held in most of the R e g i o n d e  Volga 
' ,ategion, S i k h ,  the Ulaaine and Byelorussia. The great 
; majority of these congresses followed the lead of the Cwgress 
bf Soviets of the Northern Region and adopted resolutions 
;d ing  for the transfer of all power to the Soviets. 
The crucial moment was approaching rapidly. 
- 
On M n ' s  proposal another enlarged meeting of the Central ' 
Gmmittee was held on the evening of October 16, together 
with representatives from the local Pa@ groups, the trade 
unions, and the military organizations of the Petrograd 4 
aad Moscow Committee of the Bdshevik Party. The purpose 
of this meeting w a s  to acquaint wider circles of the Party 
membership and the Party octiwe of Petrograd with the meas- 
ures that had been adopted. About thirty people were present. 
Most of the l o d  speakers reported that in the unions and in 
ttie army feeling was running high and that the masses were 
d t i n g  for the call to rise in arms. Lenin reported that an 
Wober ro the Central Committee had passed a decision to 
proceed to hmediitate insurrection, and that only Zmoviw and 
&men- had been opposed to the uprising. 
S d o v  spoke after k i n .  He said that the Party numbered 
qoo,ooo members, who were extrcmdy favorably distributed: 
S o w  in Petrograd, p,ooo in Moscow and the Moscow Re- 
gion, +,ooo in the Uds ,  and sg on. Such a  on of 
shocZr groups gmady enharwad tht role of the Bolshevik Party, 
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After Svwdlov had informed the meeting of the preparatory 
the other regions, the floor was thrown open for discussion. 
Onee more the traitors Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke against 
uprising five daysthree  days. StaIin refuted these capi 
in and Stalin, The RPLS&H RmoIution, p. 226.) 
ns of the bourgeoisie with contempt and confirmed the 
resoIution proposed by LRnin. After this, the kembers of the 
Central Committee adjourned to another room and at a closed 
eeting decided to set up a Party center, headed by Stafii, 
e next day. The members of the Party cerrter were instructed 
lutionary Military Committee, for the purpose of guiding the 
mrk from within that body, of being the very spirit of the 
uprising. After this, the meeting a adjourned and the mem- 
bers of the Party Center left for their various duties. The 
I 
=I uprising had bem set for not later than October 20 [Novrm- t 
E Z I N O W V - W N E V  TREACHERY 
hf&eii  in the CenW M f f e e I  Z I  and 
a monstrous act of ttacherp. They sent a stat+ 
e Meushdk newspawr, Nmh ZIpigrp ( O w  W*), 
they announced that the Bolsheviks were p- 
i n s u r d o n  and that they considered thc uprising a rash 
We. This statement was &vet! by Sukhanov, the editor, 
' + d o  handed it over to his fellow party m d .  The secmt' 
&f the eontempkited upding was divulged to the enemy. A 
'r'mdng of the Bureau of the All-Russian Cat rd  Executive 
&rimittee of Soviets was called immediately, The M s t -  
Xevolutionaries and Mensheviks, who dominated this m e b g ,  
p s e d  a decision to postpone the c o n d o n  of the Second 
G n p s s  of Soviets from OC- zo to O c m h  25 [Hopem- 
t%er a to Noyember 71, and to invite all Regional organizations 
and primarily the miIihuy orgmkathns to partidpate in it. 
, 
This maneuver of the petty-bourgeois counter-revolutirmaries 
was very simple. T'he So+&-Revolutides and M e n s b  
viks hoped that by postpaning the G m g r s s  to October 25 
they muId be able to bring an element of disorganhtiw into 
the ranks of the soIdiers of the r d u t i m .  On the ather hand, 
they counted on &g the additional time to pack the Congress 
with SkiaG~t-Revolrtti~es and Mensheviks. Hitherto the 
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mmsheviks had hen opposed to 
the Congmss, bad ignored the Congress; at presmt, however, 
they ? q a n  making feverish prepations for it: id the expecta- 
tion of gaining control over it. 
Due to the treachery of Zinovkv and Kamenev, the M- 
god Govefpment learned of the preparations that were being 
inade by the Bolsheviks. Kmmsky was at General Hdquartms 
in M o g f d e ~ ;  he was immediately d e d  back to the capital. 
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On the morning of October 18 the Menshevik p a p ,  the ' 
. N m p  Z&n (Th N m  Life), a m  out m+q Zmoviev's I 
and Hammer's statement. Simultaneously with the appearance 
of the paper, the garrison regiments received an urgent and 
strictly confidential order, signed by CbloneI Polkovnikov of 
General Headquartem, who was in command of the Petrograd 
MiliEary Area. This order called for the following steps to be 
taken: ( I )  dl attempts at demonstrations in the city were 
to be suppressed, (2 )  any one found arrying on agitation for 
an armed uprising was to be arrested and sent to Area Head- 
quarters, (3) the city was to be divided into districts, in each 
of which horse and fkt patrols were to be posted with the 
aim of suppressing all signs of unrest, and (4) all meetings 
I and gatherings were to be prohibited. 
In addition to this, Junkers from the military schools in 
adjoining towns were called out to Petrograd. The Winter 
Paface U s o n  was re- forced, and now numbeted r , b  men. 
A telegram was sent to the front, demanding the dispatch of 
troops. Communication was established by direct wire with 
G a d  Cheremisov, who was in command of the Northern 
Front and who was to dispatch cavalry and bicycle detachments 
to help put down the uprising. The militia was placed under 
the military authorities and augment4 by abut 600 picked 
offleers, loyal to the Provisional Government. 
In short, such measures were taken as to d e  it hpxsibl 
for the uprising to begin within the next few days. If th 
Bolsheviks had launched the offensive on October 19 or 
they would have falten into the trap set by the enemy. Th 
of Zinoviev's and Kameaev's treachery. 
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I uprising had to be postpcmed. Such was the pr&l effect 
The postponement of the uprising, however, did not mean 
th$ prepnitions were to cease. 
a=&'& 
:The Centtat Committee of the Bolshevik ParQ used th 
dorced delay to mobilize still greater forces and to prepare 
I more thoroughIy. The first thing that was done was t~ go 
wr the pfaa for the armed uprising with an eye to the even- 
taIity that the enemy might mmhow get'wind of the detairs 
I this plan. The decision pprrs made to use not only the r a m  
&md Red Guards, but also the many thmmdr of mrk- 
rr who wanted to join them but had not been enm1Ie.d be- 
rrrse of the shortage of arms. 
'RE ARMING OF THE WORKERS 
A large qrraatity of arms was stored in the Peter and Pad 
P m s  and the Kronwerk Arsenal, The a f d  workers had 
mmmnt a d i s p a e  over ro,m rifles tu the Don @om. 
:This was really ao, for taking into account the pussibility of 
Bolshevik victory in Pet- the wunter-re.volutiwarie8 - 
prepared a pkrce d'rPr;#o~ in the &n region beforehand 
were dispaaeh'mg artillery, m a c h i n q p i s  and rffles there. 
At the suggestion of the Center, a reprcsenktive of 
the Revolutioruy Military C d t t e e  was wt as a cormism 
to the Peter and Paul Fortress. His job was to exercise contml 
over thc actions of the commandant of the Fomeq and, above 
to prevent the shipment of arms to the Don. The com- 
cmtemptuously refused to aee the commissar, where- 
the h#e+ wmt wt onto the square and delivered a row- 
to the soIdiers and workers of the Arsenal. This 
m u t e  talit was stdEeimt to make the irate soldiers and 
workers retarn with the c m m h a r  to fhe eommmda~t's dice - 
k the Fortress. The commmdant immediately rushed to the 
~~ to report thii Iatest development to his superiors, 
.while the commissar sat down at the w ~ s  desk and ' 
hgan to sign orders for the issuance of arms. Several trucks 
seemingly sprang up from the very ground, and cases of arms 
were quiddy l d e d  on them and dispatched to the Putilov, 
Qbukhov and other laxge factories of Petrograd. Thanks to 
the vigilance of the workers, the rifles that were to have gone 
to ths Don were in the hands of the Bolshwiks. 
The Revolutionary Military Conmitee sent commissars to 
the Garrison regiments in order to win over the entire Gar- 
rison to its side. Late in the night of October 20, these com- 
missars appeared in the various regiments. In a very short time 
there were two hundred of them and in the course of the next 
few days their number increased to six hundred. 
The task of the commissars was to isolate the oficers, arrest- 
ing them if they showed resistance, to  create a firm nucleus 
in every reghmt of soIdiers who were lo@ to the revolution, 
to arm them and to be ready for action at the word of tbe 
Revolutionary Military Committee. In order to make a thor- 
ough job of winning over the Garrison, a permanent body- 
the Council of Regimental Delegates-was aet up. Every day 
at six p.m hundreds of regimental delegates would come to 
the Smolny where they would hear the fiery speeches of Bol- 
shevik agitators. They would leave these meetings for heir 
various regiments carrying with them a spirit of the most 
ardent revolutiopary enthusiasm. As a result of all these meas- 
ures, not only picked units but the overwhelming majority of 
the Petrograd Garrison fought on the side of the Bolsheviks 
in the October Revolution. 
The success with which the commissars met made it possible 
to send military commissars into Staff Headquarters of the 
Petrograd Military Area, the very heart of Ihe counter- 
revolution. Acting on instructions of the RwoIutionary Mili- 
tary Committee, three of its representatives turned up at Area 
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Headquarters and announced that not a single order would 
be d e d  out unless it was countersigned by the Revoluti 
Military Committm. 
Glonel ~olkovnik6v refused to accept the commissars, 
on October 22 Area Headquarters tried to send out its orders 
over their heads. But within the spce of thirty minutes, Colonel 
Polkodkov was convinced that the Bolsheviks had not been 
joking. All the orders that had been sent out by him came back 
with the inscription: "Not valid unless countersigned by 
the Revolutionary Military Committee." 
Greatly alarmed, P&oMikav reported this to Kmvalov, 
vice-chairman of the Council af Ministers. The latter rush 
to the Winter Palace to report to Kerensky. 
The appointment of regimental commis8ars and the demand 
which the Revolutionary Military Committee made on Area 
, 
Headquarters to submit all its orders to the former far en- 
dorsement was regarded by the goverament as the begidng of 
the actual seizure of power by the Soviets. 
The Provisional Government had been living in a state of 
' constantly growing alarm these last days. The Bolsheviks had 
hem keeping the govefnmwt in the greatest tension. 
AU the newspapers were filled with rumors from "reliable 
sources," hints and prophecies. On October I$ the Ryech,* the 
Cadet newspaper, carried the following item : 
"Around I a.m. on the morning of October IS, Miitia Had- 
quarters of the capital began to receive reports from various 
commissariats about sr~spicious movements of armed R 
On the following day, the same newspaper wrote: 
- 
'The Bolsheviks are preparing to act. Formerly, in order to 
keep up appearances they claimed that they were against direct 
. .  
a&. Now they have broken all born& and stop at nothing!* 
On October 18: 
"The Bolsheviks are feverishly, stubbornly and persistendy 
a plan of action and mcupying vantage grounds." 
On October 19 : 
preparing a blood bath. They are procuring arms, dtawing up 
' "The Bolsheviks are hastily arming the factory and mitl 
workers for the impending outbreak. On October 17 and 28, - . 
d f l e s  and revolv-were issued to the workers in the 
BoMevik stronghold, the Vyhrg district. On October 18, 
the workers of Bolshaya and Malaya Okhta and of the Putilov 
Works received arms." 
I I 
I 
On October m: I 
I 
"Today is October zo, a day beginning a momentous week : 
which not only St. Petersburg but all Russia associates with I 
new alarm and new anxieties. Let us give credit to the Bolshe- 
viks where credit is due. They are using every possible meam 
r to maintain the shte of alarm at the necessary high pitch, to 
render expeetations keener and to bring nervous tension to 
meh extremes that guns will begin to shmt o f  themselves." 11 1 
Every day the Ministers were besieged with the question: A 
'will the Bolsheviks take action tday ? Komvalov told news- 
paper comspdents : 
"On October 16, the Provisional Government was not aware 
e of the Bolshevik outbreak. On the previous I 
Government had b g u n  to receive informa- ' 
s had decided to take action on the I* l A  
everyone had supposed. Apparently the 1 
Bolshevih t h m l w s  have not yet arrived at a definite decision I 
on this question." 
Thus Kwovalov tried to comfort himelf, 
Matters were still, further compliated for the Provisional 
Government by the fact that the Bolsheviks were prepring 
ur the Bolshevik b c t h  of t h e  days. 
'The revoIution," wrote Comrade Stdim, "aa it were, canmou- 
Ifhged its offensive actions behind a screen of defense in order 
*by to draw into its orbit the irresolute and wavering el+ 
.meats." (Ststin, On t h  Octobw Rmlrrbio~r, p. k, Ruacs. ad.) 
The constant state of his ion hi which the Provisional GoP. 
emmmt rn hdd by the Bolshwika caused chaos and dimrgan- 
' h i o n  m its midst. The Government d d  not emerge from 
the crisis in which it was plunged. No sooner bad the resigma- 
tion of Malptori&, the Minister of Justice, been hushed up, 
than VerkhovSay, the Minister of War, amom~@d Ids re- 
On the morning of October q the Rwolutimay Militaty 
Committee made public its appointmmt of commimm to dl . 
military units of the Garrison. This annommmmt stated: 
Thii d-tion of the Revolutionary Military Committw' 
to move forces to Peh.ograd in a freng of haste. Brticu&ly 
'ures taken by the Gwernmmt explain in part why jht uprising. 
' d m  on for seveml days in MO~MIW: the c ~ l ~ l t g - m l u ~  
'tiomries had managed to prepare. 
The hasty steps taken by Kerensky gave him r a s a  to how: I' 
that tmop would arrive in short time., - 
But Kerenslq did not h o w  even the apptoximate date of the 
Bolshevik uprising. Here it was that the treachery of Trotsky 
eame to the assistance of the Provisional Gwernment. In 
answer to a question put by a soldier in the Petrograd Soviet as 
to whether the Bolsheviks were preparing for an uprising, 
Trotsky replied that any action the Bolshwiks might take would 
have to lx postponed to October 25 [November 71, when the 
Second Congress of Soviets was to open. Kerensky thereupon 
decided to take action two days before this date. 
He immediately summoned General Manikovsky, newly- 
I 
appointed chief of the War Office, and General Cheremisov, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, to see him. Both I 
generals r e p o d  on the measures that had been taken to com- 
bat the Bolsheviks. 
On W o k  23, in the evening, the Staff of the Petrogd 
Military area was closeted in a confidential session with Kern- ' 
sky. General Bagratuni, Chief of Stafl, reported in detail on the I 
measures taken to deal with the Bolshevik rising. 
It was decided at this meeting to hunch the attack on October 
24. A plan was adoptcd and transmitted to the regimental 
commanders. It was late at night when the meeting broke up. 
The Cammder of the Finnish Regiment gave this plm to a 
typist to be typed in several copies. The latter made an extra I 
copy of the plan and that same night delivered it to the Rev* 
- 
lutionary Military Committee. 
The Revolutionary Military Committee in its turn had de- 
cided to begin the uprising no later than October 24. The copy 
' 
of Kerensws plan merely served to confirm the correctness of 
this decision, for it had become quite dear that the counter- 
revolutionaries were trying to forestall the revolution. By order 
of the Revolutionary Military Committee, each regiment sent 
out'two liaison m a ,  who were to be on duty in the SmoIny, 
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1 p m m h  of the printing shop of the Rubochy Put (Wwkerb 
I path), which was appearing in p h  of t b  P ~ A  that had 
I been b e d  by the Kermsiq Gavernmetit, with a warrmt of 
' 
the Provisional Government, dated October 23, for the con- 
Wtion of the paper and the arrest of the editor. The workers 
1 refused to r-e Ws ~ ~ ~ l l t  since it was not hntersigaed 
by tRe Revolutionmy M h t q  Committee, and a re- uproar 
' & in. At the sound of the fmam, worikers w h ~  were burrpfarg 
to the fMories in fhe early hwrs of the morning bega~~ to 
- gather at the printing shop. Among them were a number of 
Red Guards, one of whom informed the .secmhry of the 
Rozhdestveaka District Commit-tee of the Party about the raid 
that had been made on the central o w  of tbe Party. The 
la- rang up Stah. 
SGllia immediately d e d  up the armored a r  dision, which 
was loyal to the BoMeviks, and at the same time warned the 
Revolutiomq M i l i w  Committee that ECerensky was attempt- 
ing to s d  the Rdochy Put. The Rew1utionary Militafy 
. CoaLmittee dispatched taro companies of the Lithuanian Regi- 
meat that w m  on duty. The revolutimmy sofdiers and the Red 
Guards pressed back the armored cmrs and p W  a reinfomed 
guard w w  the printing shop and the editorid offices of the 
Rabochy Prot. Towrds XI a.m. the Rabochy Pwt m e  out with 
a call for the overthrow of the Provisional Gwernment. 
Arwnd 10 am, Kerensb, who had occupied tbe apartment 
' in the Winter Palace of Alexander the Third, father of the 
I 
Tsar (apparently in pqaratim for assuming the role of 
Napoleon), d d e d  to the &ws of the Provisional Govern- t m m- -L 1 1 4 3  
mt and informed the Ministers tbat the plaaned attack o 
K e r e n e  deliver this information to the meeting of the P ~ P  , 
4 
parlitnt in order to secure'the &tame of the latter. After 
having received a report from Pollkovnhv to the effect that 
soldiers had been dispatched from the front, that cycle de- 
tachments muld arrive at Petrograd on the aqth and that 
tmstwwhy people had been sent out to meet them, K e r e n e  
left for the session of the Pm-parliament. When he arrived, 
the Menshevik Minister Nikitin was delivering a lengthy and 
tedious report on the chaos in the food situation throughout the 
country. The deputies were rambling about in the o(1rridors. 
Suddenly they caught sight of Kerensky. His agitated appear- 
ance was plain to see. The deputies began to sack back to the 
hall. As soon as Nikitia left the platform, Kerwsky to& his 
place and began imm&cly : 
"I d d e r  it my duty to quote to you some of the most 
characteristic passages taken from various proelamatians 
printed in the Rabocky Put and written by-that archdminal 
Ulyanov Lenin, who is wanted by the state!' 
Thereupon Kerensky, amidst shouts and calls fnrm the auiii- 
ence, began to read the passages from hi& "A Letter to the 
Comrades" in which Len21 flays the traitors Zinwiev and 
Kamenw and argues in favor of an armed uprising. Kerensky 
wnduded his speech on a hystwicd note: 
"Thus, I must state to the Provisional Council of the Russian 
A regular hubbub arose. Members of the audience demanded 
that Keredq explain how it was that he had &owed things 
'+*#'I 
1 .  
I m 4 
I 
q, Konodov suddenly mounted the steps of tbe platform 
, 
.,and handed Kwensky a note. Kemuky hurriedly read it - 
through Bnd agitatedly raised his hand for silence, iadimtkg 
1' that he had not yet concluded his apparently tished speech, ' 
L S I u m  f e . .  Kere* conhued : 
; "Ihavej lutbeenhandedaeop~ofadae~twhichirnow .', 
. circulating among the regiments." I 
In the hushed hall, Kermslcy read out: 
" 'Danger threatens the Pet- Soviet. You are hereby r 
structed to keep your regiment in complete military prepared- 
ness and to await further orders. Any delay or failure to corn- 
pJy with this order will be d e e d  treachery to the revolution. 
" 'The Revolutionary M i l i t q  Cornmi#=' " 
Pandemonium broke loose. The deputies rushed to the plat- 
form with d&ed fists. Kerensb was blamed for the uprising 
that was beginning. The deputies demanded that the most 
stringent measures be taken. A 2 :05 p.m., amidst stormy a p  
plause, K e m k y ,  having secured the consent of d parties to I 
any measures that he might see fit to take against the Bolsl~e- 
viks, hastened to the Winter Palace for the purpose of proceed- 
ing agrinst the uprising. 
While Kerensky had been delivering his hysterical and 
-1 
lengthy speech, a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bot 
shevik Party had taken place in the Smolny. Here, without any 
' 
specks or loss of time, tfie following decisions had h e n  
adopted : Dzenhinsky was to occupy the Post and Telegraph I 
Office; the two representatives of the Kronatadt Swiet who - d 
were in Petrogd at the time were to be sent to Krmistadt; 
3,f oxow was to be in farmed of the commtmcemmt of the armed 
'.I 
uprising, for which purpose one representative was to b sent 
' 1 
there tbnt day and another the next ; two thousand Red Gum& 
, 4  
were to k s~rmm~ned from 
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Sverdlov was instructed to keep a watch over every step of the 
Provisiorutl Government. In short, the entire carefully-prepxed 
sm of i n s d o n  had been set in motion. 
At ,3 ,p.m., when j d e r  detachments appeared at the draw- 
on Kerenskyls orders to raise them and cut off the 
working dass districts from the center, the counter-revoIution- 
ary troops found Red Guards, sailors and soIdiers from the 
Garrison already posted there by order of the Revolutionary 
Military Committee. As a matter of fact, they had been there 
for so long that the Red Guards at the Nilayevsky Bridge 
had settled dawn for a nap, and the Junkers, taking them by 
surprise, seized the bridge. - 
Learning of this, the Revolutionary Military Committee 
issued orders to the commissar of the cruiser Aurom to land a 
party and recapture the bridw Around 5 p.m. the Peter and 
Paul Fortress fhalIy went over to the side of the revolution. 
By 5 p.m. the Telegraph Office had been a m .  Code mes- 
sages were immediately sent out to all regions with the informa- 
tion that the uprising had begun. 
LEMN AT SMOLNY 
A note describing all the measures that had been taken was 
sent to k i n ,  who was anxiously awaiting news at his secret 
lodgings in the Vyborg district. He hastily wrote a note asking 
pmission of the Central Committee to go to the Smolny. The 
housewife in whose apartment Lenin was staying undertook 
to deliver the note, but was unable to cross by way of the 
Nikolayevsky Bridge since the Junkers had occupied it. There- 
fore she delivered the note to the Vyborg District Committee 
of the Party and from there its contents were transmitted by - 
phone to Stdin at the Smdny. The latter replied that it would ' 
be too dangerous for Lenin to leaw his place of concealmen* I 
npm reeiving this rep(l, L d n  rmt. another I-, this 
I time a fairly long cme. This L the famous leqfcr that be&l~ i as foUm.: 
I 'Comrades, 
"I am writing these lines on the evening of October a+ The 
I situation is cri t id  in the extreme. It is absolutely clear that to 
dday the iasumdm now will be veritably fatal. . . . 
n We must at all costs, this very evening, this very night, 
wrest the Government, ih t  disarming the Junkers (defeating 
them, if they mist), and so forth. . . . Under no circumstances 
must the power be left in the h d s ' o f  Kerensky d Co. until 
the 25th-not under any circumstances; the matter must be 
decided without fail this very evening, or this very night." 
, (Lenin and Stdin, The Russiafi Rmolutiotr, pp. 23-3r.) 
Taking this letter the same comrade made her way to the 
Smolny. She was obliged to go all the way on foot as the street- 
- were not running. By the time she returned, the Central 
Committee had already sent for Lenin. There was a representa- 
tive of the Centd Committee ia the apartment. In order to 
avoid an argument &Kith his hostess, Lenixl seat her to the 
,%dny with a third note to the Central Commit&. When she 
returned the apartment was dark No one was home. The table 
/ waa set for two in prepatation for the evening d. And on 
, the bottom of one plate was scrawled: "I have gone to the 
place you didn't want me to go to." 
Lenin had donned a wig, put a bandage around his £ace and 
had gone out with the Control Committee representative. 
' On the way a street-car passed them, h d  for the a- 
[ bun, Lenin hoppad on thiwph the fmnt cnhracr The driver 
was a woman. 
'Where are you mhing to?" he asked. 
'What a question t" she replied. "And yau a work, tool 
Not to know where we're going! Why, m're going to k n d  
the shdkgs out of the bourgeois $ 
47 
upon hearing this, hain began to e w i a  to the driver what 
was behind dl these events. His companion was on pins and 
needles. The car was packed and LRnin might be mmgnhd 
at any minute. Fortunately, the car turned into the terminus 
just then and the two jumped off. 
They arrived at the Smolny around midnight after 
diikulties. L.4n immediately went upstairs to the second story, 
sent for Stalin, and without removing his wig sat down on a 
window-sill to wait for him. Just then the Menshevik Dan 
m e  out of the Conference Hall carrying a package. Undoing 
the @age, he turned to bis companions and said : "I'm f 
fuUy hungry. Wouldn't you like some sandwiches?" 
b ~ u i t c  by chance, he glanced in the direction of the window 
and apparently recognized Lenin. Slowly, he tied up his pschge 
again and moved off to the door. Laughiig and wink'~ng, the 
others shuffied out after him. 
Stalin came in and told Lmh about all the measures that 
bad been taken. 
After. middght messengers carrying news of -the uprising 
hurried tbrough the city, d i n g  out new detachments. Accord- 
ing to a prearranged p h ,  these detachmats -pied the 
premises of government institutions. They met with no resist- 
ance on the part of the guards. In une place the soldiers de- 
clared that they would not surrender. The Red Guards unslung 
their rifles, but it soon dear tbat it was all a misunder- 
sWng+he soldiers mesnt that they would not smcnder to 
the Provisionat .Govemmeot, as for the Revolutionary Military 
Committee, they were only too eager to assist it in every way, 
The two detachments thus d n e d  on guard there. 
At r rg +m. the post o0ice was accupid At 2 am. th U y stations and tbe power station were taken. The pawer was 
hudiatdy shut off in the Witer Palace. At 6 a.m. the State 
Bank was eked, Thus the mchlht revolution did not repeat 
&e mista%e of the Paris Commune, which had left the bank in' 
&c hands of the counter-revolu~ehi. 
At 7 am. tbc Paface Bridge under Kerensky's very windows 
was taken, Glancing through the window Kerenslry IooM out 
out a sea of Red Guard bayonets. He realized that there muld 
be no question of any attack on his part now. b h g  no time, 
he dashed over to Ara Headquarters. Polkovnikov, who 
been so confident only the day before, today, at the dawn of 
October 25, a n m m c d  that not a single regiment had come 
out and tbat even the Cossacks were refusing to budge During 
the night the district hezrdquarters of the Red @urd Lad stu- 
rormded the Cossack regknb.  When the G s s x k s  attempted 
to 1- their barracks, they were confronted with machfne 
guns. Several Jrrnker schools, as, for the hvlwsky 
School for J&s, were likewise surrounded in $sod time, 
KERENSKYS FLIGHT d 
Kerensky realized that his ody salvation lay in fight. 
- IXe decided to apply to the foreign powers for assisttame An 
adjutant was sent to the Italian military attack with a request 
for an a u t o d .  The latter said tbat he would be deIightad 
to give his car to the Supreme Command, but that he had no 
gasoline. Thereupon the adjutant d e d  off to the Ameria 
attache. The Amerbn wid that he wdd give him a cat. but 
insisbed that fie be taken to see the Commander-in-Chief. The 
inquisitive Yankee was then taken to the Winter Palace dme 
he saw Keredcy and shook hands with him e y ,  Ke@ 
got into the car, which a flying the American hg, and was 
driven wt to the Square. 
Seeing the flag of a foreign power, t$e Red Guards d d  1 the automobile to pass. Swiftly KerrarLy sped down the 
Nevsky, to Tsarskoye Syelo and from there to Pskov, w h i i  
was s part of the front. This Sght of the Prime Minister of 
the k t  bourgeois governmeat was an admission by ICerensky 
of the victory of the revolution in Petrograd; not, of course, 
that the revolution needed any such admission. 
At 10 a n  on the morning of the 25th Leuin wrote the 
farmus manifesto "To the Citizens of Russia" in the Smolny. 
"The Provisional Government has been overthrown. The 
power of state has passed into the hands of the organ of the 
Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and SoIdiers' Deputies, the Rev- 
olutionary Military Committee, which stands at the head of 
the Petrograd proletariat and garrison. 
"The cause for which the people have fought-the immediate 
proposal of a democratic peace, the abolition of landlordism, 
workers' control over production and the creation of a Soviet 
Government-is assured. 
"Long live the revolution of the workers, soldiers and 
psants !" 
At Ir a.m. this manifesto could already be seen posted 
throughout, the city. Nothing remained in h hands of the 
Provisional Government bat the Winter Palace. All government 
itlstitutions had been taken without a single shot bekg fired. 
All roads leading to Petrograd were in the haads of the 
I t  was decided to attack the Winter Palace as soon as the 
sailors arrived from Hdsingfors atld Kronstadt. The Kron- 
stadt detachment w a s  held up, however, because of stormy 
wmther at sea. Moreover, for every ten men called up, a 
hundred volunteered, which complimted setting up the detach- 
ments and dispatching them. 
Meanwhile, at 2 :35 p.m. a special meeting of the Petrograd 
Soviet ma opened. Lain addressed this meeting for the first 
time after aa e n f o r d  absence of over three and a half months. 
In a brief speech, Lenin reported the victory of the revolution. 
"From now on," he said, ''a new phase in the history of 
Russia begins, and this revaltltion, the third Russian revolu- 
tion, should in the end lead to the victory of socialism" 
The Petrograd Soviet resolved to place dl its 3,- mem- 
k s  at the disposal of the Revolutionary Military Committee. 
The meeting had smely been concluded when the ships 
from Krwtadt steamed into the month of the Neva. The 
d o r s  h d e d  in quick order and took up their posts. The 
Winter P a h e  wae completely surrounded. Preparations for 1 
the assault on the Palace begaa The Peter and Paul Fortress 
was to raise the Red Flag, and upon seeing this the Aurora 
wodd fire a round from its six-inch guns. This was to be 
the signal for the attack. Wishing to spare the furces of the 
mvolutionary army as much as pssible and to save the Palace 
building itself from destruction, the Revolutionary MilitaFy 
Committee decided to present the Provisional Gwmment 
with an ultindurn, The demand to surrender the Palace on 
pain of artillery fire was hastily written on a scrap of paper 
and given to a rankad-file member of the cycle detachment 
who volunteered to deliver it. Waving a white haadkerchief 
as a flag of truce the cyclist approached the Winter Palace. 
The Junkers took him to the Staff Headquarters of the Mili- 
tary h, which adjoined the Palace. There he met Kishkin, 
who had been appointed dictator of the city a* K m k y l  
flight, and his two assistan+PalchinsEry and Ruthenberg. 
The cyclist deIimred the ultimatum. In the rush, they had 
forgotten to set a time limit for the dtimatum and the cy~liist 
bimseIf set the limit at twenty minutes. 
,ceiaing the ultimatum, KishIdn dashed into the P a h e  to 
cunfer with the Government. The members of the Provisional 
Govexnment were in the M-tov Hall, from the windows 
. of which the Peter and Paul Fortress and the cruiser Aurora 
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could be seen Before replying it rn decided to consult Gen- 
eral Headquarters. Either through treachery or because proper 
, 
pteautionary measures had not yet ken tzLm by the insurgent 
masses, a connection was established with General Headquarters 
by d i e  wire. The tape recording tip conversation has been 
presemed. Dukhonin reprted that troops had been dispatched 
and proposed that the Government hold out till they arrived. 
Upon receiving this information, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, the Menshevik Niltitin, called up Moscow. The tele- 
phone operator at the Exchange managed to fool the inexperi- 
e n d  Red Guard who was stationed there to keep a check on -- ' 
the calls she put through, and connected Nikitin with Rudnev, 
the Socialist-Revolutionary Mayor of Moscow. Rudnev was , 
I. informed of the ultimatum, of the conversation with Dukhonin 
I and of the decision not to surrender. He was also told that in I 
the event of the arrest of the Provisional Government, he, I 
Rudnev, was charged with the formation of a new government. 
Meanwhile the twenty minutes had dapsed. The cyclist t m e d  
to Genera1 Poradelov and demanded an answr. Poradelov 
asked for an aclditional ten minutes, so that he could get in 
touch with the Winter Palace. The cyclist agreed to give him I ten more minutes. While the general was talking to the Pdace , 
aver the phone, the cyclist went out of the buildmg into the I 
street, where under cover of the darkness the Red Guards bad 1 
hgm to gather. Exactly ten minutes Iater, the doors of the ' 
Staff Headquarters were burst open, and the Red Guards en- 
tered and arrested Poradelov, who was still at the phone, and , 
all the Staff officers. 
The news of the seizure of Staff Headquarters was taken to , 
mean the fall of the Winter Mace. A11 further preparations . 
wise stopped and the commanders of the revolutionary troops 
began to rush towards the Winter Mace. They were met with 
P 
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m c ~ e - g w  fire. ~t was ming on g pm. before t i e  
thing was strakghtmed out and the mistake cleared up. 
sent a note from the Smolny to the commander of the revofu- 
tionary troops besieging the Winter Palace, ordering him to 
attack immediately. At g p.m. a tRarning shot w& M fromw 
- the Peter and Pad Fortress, followed by the thunder of the 
six-iach guns of the AWMB- The attack ahrrd begun. 
The Red Guards rolled out a three-iach gun, mounted it{ 
under the arch leading to the Palace Square, and fired two shdls I 
point-blank at the Winter Palace. One shell broke d part of 
' 
the cornice, mother hit the room adjoining the qne in w W  I 
the members of the Provisional C;wmmmt were sitting. The 
Ministers moved to the inside rooms of the Palace. 
The first group of saiIors that forred its way into the Wmkr 
Palace was captured, but the appearance of Red Guards within 1 1  1 
the P a h e  had caused extreme consternation ia the tanks of - 
its defenders. In order to raise the general spirit, Palchinsky 
called together some of the Junkers and began to ddive~  a 
speech to them. He told them that Kerensky's troop were 
approding Petrograd and had taken Luga, same thirty kilo- I . 
meters from Petrwd.  
Sudddy someone shouted out: ''Lugs is not thirty kilo- 
meters from Petrograd but one hundred and thirty! You 
ought to h o w  portr geography I" 
The effect of the speech was entirety lost. hkhimky made 
no attempt to a h  what he had been saying, turned and went 
out. Sqme of the Junkers hasbed from the hall, shouldered 
arms and left the Palace. NevertheIess, there were still over nine 
hundred armed Junkers, exclusive of officers, in tbe Palace. 
In older to amash the resishxe of the defenders of the h2 
Winter Palace, artillery iire was opened on it from the Peter 
same time rifle and machine-gun f i e  opened up. The Pro- 
visional Government would fall at any moment now. For the 
last time Nikitin rang up the Municipal Duma. Kuskovq a 
that a delegation consisting of representatives from all the 
parties ms heading for the Winter Palace. The members of 
Constitutional-Democrat members of the Duma, informed him 
. 
the Municipal Duma were discussing the question of whether 
to go to the Winter Palace. The floor was taken by Minister 
Prokopvich, who compIained that he had not been dowed to 
enler the Palace. 
"Now, when our chosen representatives are facing death, let 
us forget party differences and brave dmtb together," proposed 
They got out onto the street and began to form ranks. Just 
then the delegation that had left for the Winter PaIace re- 
turned. The deputies of the Municipal Duma retraced their 
steps and entered the building again. The delegation informed 
them that they had not been permitted to board the Awwa or 
to enter the Winter Palace. 
Then lCountess Panina took the floor and decked that if 
the deputies were not permitted to enter the Winter Palace, they 
could at least stand before the guns and die in front of the 
Wmter Palace. 
Once again the deputies went out onto the street and began 
to fall in. This time a representatives of the AU-Russian 
easant Council came running up with the request to wait for 
he third time. On the way to the Winter Palace they were 
by a detachment of seven sailors and entered into a 
with them. The sailors declad that the Revolutionary 
Military Coqnittee had given orders to dm no one to 
Voices were raised in angry shouts. One of the sailors 
out sharply above the tumult: "Disperse to your homes 
leave us in peace I" It was sufficient for these political wrp 
hear a d s e d  voice for them all to turn back. 
In any case, it was too late to go to the Whtw Palac& 
At rI  p.m. sharp, a rifle shot rang out as the signal for the 
h a l  attack. Red Guards rushed the Winter Palace from alf 
sides. In places they were beaten off, but they managed to break 
in through most of the entrances and began to mtter through 
the halls on the fist and second stories. They soon came upm 
the room where the Prov i s id  Government was sitting and 
placed its members under arrest. Their names were taIren down, 
a check up was made to see if they were all there, and they 
were then convoyed to the Peter and Paul Fortress by way of 
the Troitsky Bridge. When the men at the foxtress saw the 
' convoy approaching they opened fire, thinking the enemy was 
attempting an attack. The order was given to fall prone, and 
down the Ministers went. After a moment or so ffie fire ceased. 
Wet and muddied, the Ministers rose from the ground and 
entered the fortress. Rumor bas it that when they were being 
placed in their cells, one of the Ministers complained to Uritsky, 
who had been appointed commandant of the fortress, that the 
cells were damp and very close; to which Uritsky replied : 'Yo 
built these cells yourselves, you have only purseIves to blame. 
POWER PASSES TO THE SOVIETS 
The news of the capture of the Wmter Palace was sent to th 
Smolny, where the Second AlERussian Congress of Sovie 
had been opened at 10 4 5  p.m. on Lain's proposal. 
The B o l s h ~ s  ecured an o v e r w h ~  majoriv at tb 
Congress. The Mensheviks, Bundists and Right S 
~ ~ - . E ~ . .  ; rk
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RevoIutionaries, seeipg that their day was done, left the 'Con- F- 
5' 1 .grws, announcing that they refused to take any part in its 
f Iabors, The Congress condemned them and, far from q m t t h g  1 
h their withdrawal, we1mmed it, for with their departure the 
Congresn had become a genuinely Molutiomry congress. 
I The news of the storming of the Winter Palace was received 
- with the wildest enthusiasm. The Cmgress prodah& that all 
i power had passed to the Soviets. 1 
"Back& by the will of the vast majority of the workers, 
soldiers and peasants, backed by the victorious uprising of th 
workers and the garrison which has taken p h e  in Petrograd, 
the Congress takes the power into its own hands," the proclam4 
tion of the Second Congress of Soviets read. 
~ ~ 4 t h ~  Lenin nor Staiin spoke at this sitthg of the congress. 1 
The two organkers of the victorious revolution were en& 
in work of exceptionally great impartarm at the time. The 
Provisional Government had left Petrogmd only a 
day supply of bread and flour, hoping in this way to'make the 
L Bolsheviks' first gift to the peopl+hunger. All day and all It night Lenin and Stdin worked at organizing armed detach- 
ments, placing a Bolshevik in command of each, and sending 
them out to wkh the dty, to scour the stations, to open all 
mihad an, but to find flour or grain. And on the a6th of 
W b e r  the leaders of the revolution received the report: grain 
- 
sufficient for ten days bad been found. 
It was only then that Leain put in his apmrance in the 
SmoIny hall. When Lenin took the floor, he was unable to hgin 
g his spach b u s e  of the stormy ovation he was acwrded as 
I the leader and organizer of the victorious revolution. Finally, 
" quieted down and Lmin begm to rpak. With- 
out my solemn declarations, without any long-winded in- 
t- ductions, he shwd his speech by reading the decree on peace. 
m 
And this dm, Wears-like beginning iRiis &a6&siic of 
stem face of the revolution, was characteristic of all the f 
work. Lwi spoke a second time at this sitting, resding out the 
deeree w the h a ,  S~CCM- to which over rp,oQom d d a -  
tins * of former Iandtord, crown and monastery land passed- 
into the hands of the tailing pasantry- 
hunderous applause and cheers burst forth for the third 
time when the formation of the Council of People's Commkam 
was announced--the fist workers' and psants' governmeat 
in the -Id in the first vidoriotls socialist revolution. Lenin hI l ~ a s  endorsed as of the Council of People's Corn- 
missam, and Stalin, who had built up the Bohh& Party 4 
t-er with Lenin, who had -red the great October So- 
cialist Rwdtttiw together with Lenin, who had led it to victory 
togetber with hh, waa d r m e d  its the People's C o d s a r  
of Nationalities. 
WHY THE REVOLUTION WAS VICTORIOUS 
. Not a single revohtion in the world was so bloodless as the ' 
revolution in Petmgrad. 
The History of iks Communist Pwty  of the S d t  Union 
analyzes the reawns for the victory of the revolution with ex- ' 
c e p t i d  profundity. 
The great October Sodalist Revolution, it says, was victori- 
ous, first, because it "was cwfronted by an enemy so com- 
paratively weak, so M l y  organized and so politically inexperi- 
enced as the Russian bourgeoisie." (Op. kt., p. 2x2.) 
Russian capitalism had made its appearance on the world 
arena when a11 the free territory of the globe bad already been 
occupied by countries in which capitalism had developed much 
d i e r  and was conswuentlv on a much hkher plane. The onh 
way to wrest a god bit for oneself now was by brute force. 
Tsarism with its mighty army of one and a half millions pos- 1 
scssed this quality. 
The Russian bourgeoisie needed tsarism as a police fmce 
over the proletariat. That is why the bourgeoisie supported tsar- 
ism, and especially its &tory foreign policy. This suppoe 
partly explains why tsarism existed for so long in Russia, b e  
overtbrown only in February, 1917. 
13ut the Crimean campaign (in 1854) had already shown 
that it was beyond the powers of Russia to compete with capi- 
talist Europe. The unsuccessful war, in which the flintlock of 
tbe Russian army was so badly beaten by the rBed bore, tore 
the mask from the supposed might of tsarism: to the eyes of 
the astoni4lred world Russia now appared a colossw with feet 
of clay. To make up a11 the shortcomings and to wrest itself 
from foreign dqendence, it was necessary to accelerate the 
growth of large-scale industry. The tsarist government bepn to 
build more railways and more iron and steel works. Subsidies 
were granted to the capitalists. In order to protect its own 
capitalists from competition with cheap goods, the Government 
erected high-tariE barriers, setting substantial duties on im- 
ported goods. 
Both these measures robbed the masses of the population. 
It was the people who were fleeced to provide the money for the 
subsidies granted the capitalists. And the protective tariff 
obliged the people to overpay for every nail, for every yard 
of cloth. At the close of the nineteenth century, sheet iron in 
St. Petersburg sold at from 3 rubles 4 kopeks to 3 rubles as 
kopeks a pood (about 35 Ibs.), while in London the price was 
practically a third as much-I ruble 13 kopeks. For calico done 
the working people of Russia overpaid more than ~w,ooo,ooo 
rubles autruaIly! 
58 
Despite government patronage, industry in R u s k  did not 
make s f i e n t  progress to at& up with the equipment of . 
Western Europe. If was necessary to apply to foreign capital , 
again and again. And the foreign capitalists were only tm eager 
: to advance loans. They never dreamed that tsarism could b 
swept away by a revolutim. 
In order to get round the high tarifl barriers, French, Eng- 
lish, German and Belgian capitalists began to build factories in 
Russia it&£. Tsarism found itself in a vidous circle. To rid 
itself of foreign dependence, large-de industries had beea set 
up in Russia. But the capital required for this purpose came 
from abroad, and this merely served to haease the dependence 
on foreign cap; tal. 
The Russo-Japanese War and particularly the rgog Revolu- 
tion once again forced tsarism to its bees in supplication to 
foreign capital. The Paris Stock E x c h a v t  that time the 
hub of international loan capitat- to the aid of tsarism. 
The French capitalists needed tsarism in its fight against the 
Geman manufacturers, needed it to wring the interest on the 
old Russian loans from the people, needed it to safeguard the 
factories of the foreign capitalists in Russia, and most of all 
needed it to crush the ~volution,  sparks of which might kindle 
a mighty conflagration across the Russian border as well. 
Russia's state debt rose uncmtrollably. The new bans scarce 
ly sufficed to cover the interest on the old. 
Rallying from the effects of the defeat in the Russo-Japanese 
War and crushing the Revolution on funds supplied by the 
foreiga imperialists, tsarism became irrevmbly enmeshed in 
the h n d s  of foreign capital. A numkr of the principal 
branches of industry were practically the mmopolies of foreign 
capitalists. The Frmch and British controlled over p per cent 
of the iron and steeI works in Russia, the Germans o m  ro 
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per cent. The iron and steel industry, locomotive aud railway 
car c o n s t d m  works, dint+building plants, the cod mining 
and oil industries were almost entirely in the h d s  of 
f orcigners. 
h r h g  the World War, Russian dependence on foreign capi- 
tal increased sharply. Tsarist Russia conducted the war on 
funds supplied by the French and British imperialists. In three 
yum the foreign debt tripled, rising from 4,5w,ooop gold 
rubIes to the mormous sum of ~a,m,mo,oool By cutting 
down or incrdng the credit they extended, the foreign im- 
perialists could direct the p o l i i  of tsarism as they c h  
Russia became in essence a semkolony, of which the British 
and French ambassadors felt themselves the uncrowned r u l w ~  
Millions of workers and peasants of Russia perished for the 
sake of the predatory interests of the foreign imperidists. 
CountIess wofking people of Russia fell victim becaw of the 
policy of the feudal landlords and the hrgaisie ,  which was 
directed towards preserving the backwardness of the counhy I 
and its dependence on foreign capital. 
The bourgeois-dcmocratic revolution in F e h a q ,  1917, 
- not effect any change. The change in gommment did not chm* 
the imperialist nature of the war: under the bwrgeois h m i w  
i d  Government, as under the tsarist wvemment, the war' 
rmtained a predatory one and was mntinued on the very same 
enslaving loans from the foreign imperialists. *'] 
"From the viewpoint of world policy and i n m d  
h m w  capihl," wrote M n ,  "the Gwhkov-Mily&v govern- 
ment is simply a clerk in the baaking firm of 'Britain and 
Fme, '  an instrument for the continuation of the impendkt 
slaughter of the peoples." (V. I. L d n ,  Collected WwRs, Vol. 
XXX, p. 315, Rum. 4.) 
_ The entire courlre of the historid devekrpuent of Russian 
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explains the wedmess and inexperience of the Russian bwr- 
geoisie. As the History of the Cm& Parfy of tks S h t  
Unim states : 
"It had neither the experience of the French 
example, in politid d i n a t i o n  and politid I broad d e ,  nor the schooling of the British 
broadly conceived crafty compromise." (OP. cit., p. ara. 
Nor were the compromisers-the Sccialist-Revol11tioala 
and Menshw-f asaistance to the Russian bourgeoisie. 
the course of many years of struggle, the Bolsheviks had ex 
posed the Sodalist-Rwolutiotlaries and Mensheviks as agents o 
the bourgeoisie. In the stormy months bf the Revolution o 
99x7 tbe Bolshwiks had isolated these compromising agents o 
the imperialist bourgeoisie by means of their far-reaching an 
extensive agitational and propaganda work, with the mdt 
the bourgeoisie and its Provisional Gwemment were left w l  
out a support. Another reason for the celerity and s u c u s  of 
the socialist revolution was the fact that : 
class as the working class of Russia, a class which had 
steeled in battle, which had in a short space passed through 
revolutions, and which by the w e  of the third revoIution 
The condition of the working class in old Russia was 
tionally difficult. The exhausting working day averaging twel 
md a half, and in the textile industry as much as fifteen. hou 
sapped all energy. Unemployment w a s  a constant threat to tb 
vivals as existed in tsarist Russia. The d i c t a t d p  of the 
feudal landlord hindered the development of capitalism. The 
working class of t w i s t  Russia suffered doubly : bath because of 
capitalism and bemuse of tbe insdcimt development of capi- 
talism and the lack of all civic rights. Hence it was the working 
class which, in its very 6 r s t  actions, headed the revolutionary 
movement of all democratic elements in town and country 
against tsarism. Because of its determination and persistence 
the working class succeeded in awakening and rousing all the 
working people, all the peoples inhabiting the "prison of na- 
tions," as Lenin called tsarist Russia, for the struggle against 
the autoeraq. 
In one of his earliest works, Whaf thu '*Fries& of the 
People" Are a d  How They Fight Agaiwt the Sod-Demo-  
cm&, written as far back as 1894 knin had foretold that "the 
Russian worker, rising at the head of all the democratic eIe- 
meats, will overthrow absolutism and lead the Russian prole- 
tariat (side by side with the proletariat of all countries) along 
t h  stmight road of open political struggle ta-dx bL vie- 
tmbu c o a w ~ & t  r m l w t i o ~ . "  (V. I. X n ,  Se led~d  Works, 
Vol. XI, p. 575.) 
This brilliant forecast of the great leader of the working 
people has been borne out. The proletariat prepared for its role 
as leader in Iong years of struggle and mme out as the hegeman, 
the acknowIedged Ieader of the masses. 
The third reason for the victory of the revolution was that: 
"The working class of Russia had so effective an ally in the 
revolution as the poor peasantry, which comprised the over- 
whelming majority of the peasant population." (History of the 
Conrmureisf Partj) of the S&t U&on, p. 2x3.) 
The poor peasantry constituted 65 per cent of the population 
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in old Russia Tens of millions of people lived in a state of 
semi-stamation, The lack of land and the exorbitant 
crushed the peasant poor, Over 6o,m,ow hectares of land 
belonged to a mere 30,000 landlords, who forced the peasants 
to work for them as in the epoch of serfdom. 
From the very first days of the Party's existence, the Bol- 
sheviks carried on an enormous amount of work mong the pmr 
peasants. The masses of the peasantry realized that they could 
win land, p a e  and bread only under the leadership of the 
Party of Lenin and Stalin. 
"This served as a solid basis for the alliance of the proIetariat 
and the poor peasantry. The existence of this alliance between 
the working class and the poor peasantry determined the con- 
duct of the middle peasants, who had long been vacillating and 
only on the eve of the October uprising wholehWedly swung 
over towards the revolution and joined forces with the poor 
peasants." (Ibib.) 
The October Socialist Revolution was a popular revolution, 
The Bolsheviks won the masses away from the Socialist-Revo- 
lutiorwies and Mensheviks. The overwhelming majority of the 
working people supported the proletariat, headed by the Bol- 
shevik Party. 
The international situation also did much to facilitate the via 
tory of the great October Sodalist Revohtion. The entire im- 
perialist world was split into two hostile m p s  and was ab- 
sorbed in the imperialist World War. Clutching at one another's 
throats, neither the Anglo-French bloc nor the German bIoc 
could render direct military aid to the Russian bourgeoisie. In 
face of the devastating onslaught of the proletariat, which led 
the masses of the working people after it, the Russian bour- 
geoisie was unable to hold out by itself. It was with good yea- 
son that Lenin called the victorious and rapid spread of the 
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act that it was beaded by so tried, militant and revolutionary a 
party as the Bolshevik Party. Under the leadership of Lenin 
and W i n ,  the Party succeeded in smashing the traitorous fol- 
lowers of Trotsky and Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, rally- 
ing the proletariat around its banner. The Aexible and wise 
of the Party convinced the work& p p l e  of the correct- 
into the struggle. 
"Only a party like the Bolshevik Party, caungous enough to 
Iead the people in decisive attack, and mutious enough to steer 
clear of all the submerged rocks in its path to the goal, only such 
a party could so skillfully merge into one cornmvn revolutionary 
torrent such diverse revolutianary movements as the general 
democratic movement for peace, the peasant democratic move- 
ment for the seizure of the landed estates, the movement of the 
tatorship of the pro let aria^" (lbid.) 
lutions as weU, Most peoples had experienced revolutions be- 
fore. A favorable balance of forces had accompied a nurnkr 
of revolutions. But not one of these revolutions was I d  by so 
consistently revolutionary, so devoted and wise, so firmly welded 
and flexible a party as the Bolshevik Party. The fact that it 
was led by the Party of Lain and Stalin was the principal 
condition that in the final d y s i s  determined the course and 
outcome of the great h b e r  Socialist Revolution, which was 
I . . ,  
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